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Abstract—This paper presents a wireless neural recording sys-
tem featuring energy-efficient data compression and encryption.
An ultra-high efficiency is achieved by leveraging compressed
sensing (CS) for simultaneous data compression and encryption.
CS enables sub-Nyquist sampling of neural signals by taking
advantage of its intrinsic sparsity. It simultaneously encrypts the
data with the sampling matrix being the cryptographic key. To
share the key over an insecure wireless channel, we implement
an elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) based key exchanging
protocol. The CS operation is executed in a custom-designed
IC fabricated in 180nm CMOS technology. Mixed-signal circuits
are designed to optimize the power efficiency of the matrix-vector
multiplication (MVM) of the CS operation. The ECC algorithm is
implemented in a low-power Cortex-M0 microcontroller (MCU).
To be protected from timing and power analysis attacks, the
implementation avoids possible data-dependent branches and
also employs a randomized ECC initialization. At a compression
ratio of 8x, the average correlated coefficient between the
reconstructed signals and the uncompressed signals is 0.973,
while the ciphertext-only attacks (CoA) achieve no better than
0.054 over 200,000 attacks. The prototype achieves a 35x power
saving compared with conventional implementation in low-power
MCUs. This work demonstrates a promising solution for future
chronic neural recording systems with requirements in high
energy efficiency and security.
Index Terms—Neural recording, compressed sensing, hardware
security, cryptographic circuits, low power, mixed-signal IC.
I. INTRODUCTION
LArge-scale neural recording with high energy efficiencyand safety is crucial to the growing number of therapies
employing closed-loop neurostimulation and neuroprosthetics
to treat brain injury and disease [1]. Although the research
community has devoted a considerable amount of effort to
improve the performance and power efficiency of neural
recorders, few investigations have been done to mitigate the se-
curity risks. In fact, cybersecurity issues have already emerged
in FDA-approved medical devices [2]. Medical devices, in-
cluding neural interfacing devices, pose serious risks from
malicious attacks. Compromised neural interfacing devices
may not only disclose critical health-related information, but
also leave the users vulnerable to life-threatening attacks.
Thus, it is urgent to investigate secure neurotechnologies.
Battery-powered wireless neural recording devices are es-
pecially vulnerable to malicious attacks, and their restrained
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energy budget imposes a significant challenge to implement-
ing data encryption. In this work, we propose a framework
that achieves ultra-high energy efficiency by leveraging the
compressed sensing (CS) technique for joint neural signal
compression and encryption, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The
Fig. 1. Illustration of the proposed neural recorder with CS and encryption.
key concept of CS is that a sparse signal can be sampled
at a reduced rate (below Nyquist frequency) based on the
actual amount of information it contains [3]. Since the CS
operation can be implemented in low-complexity hardware,
it is especially attractive in low-power applications. Neural
signals are proven to be sparse in certain domains (or pre-
learned dictionaries) [4]. Recent studies have successfully
demonstrated highly efficient CS-based neural recorders [5–
10]. Moreover, CS theory also permits its application in data
encryption [11]. It has been proven that CS can provide a
computational guarantee of secrecy, provided that an adversary
doesn’t know the sampling matrix [12]. Recently, several
works have explored this property in image processing [13, 14]
and internet of things (IoT) applications [15, 16]. We present
in this paper, to the best of our knowledge, the first imple-
mentation in neural recording systems.
To implement CS-based encryption in a neural record-
ing system, several challenges must be addressed. First, the
sampling matrix (i.e. the cryptographic key) must be safely
exchanged between the neural recorder and authorized external
system. Secondly, mechanisms must be introduced to protect
the energy features of the neural signals from being leaked.
Thirdly, the hardware implementation must be protected from
side-channel attacks, such as timing and power analysis attacks
[17, 18]. Last but not least, the overall encryption cannot lead
to a significant power penalty. To conquer these challenges, we
propose a novel system that combines an ASIC for ultra-low
power CS operations, and a general-purpose microcontroller
(MCU) for low duty-cycle key establishment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II describes
the operating principles of the proposed system. Section III
presents the implementation details. Section IV shows the
experimental results. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
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2II. OPERATING PRINCIPLES
A. CS for Joint Signal Compression & Encryption
Suppose the targeting signal x has a sparse representation s
on a certain basis Ψ, CS theory predicts that x can be sampled
at a reduced rate (depending on its sparsity) with nearly no
information loss. This compressed sampling process can be
expressed as a simple linear projection, given by:
y = Φx (1)
where x ∈ RN×1, y ∈ RM×1, and Φ ∈ RM×N . Note that
N>M , and the term N/M is referred to as compression ratio
(CR). Although y cannot be solved directly from Eq. (1), if
the sampling matrix Φ is incoherent with Ψ (obeying the
restricted isometry property (RIP) [19–21]), then the sparse
representation s, thus the original signal x, can be solved as a
convex optimization problem [20]:
min ||s||0 (or 1), s.t. y = Φx = ΦΨ−1s (2)
It has been proven that a random matrix Φ with a Gaussian
probability density distribution is sufficient in fulfilling the
incoherent requirement [20].
The secrecy property of CS has also been rigorously dis-
cussed in the literature [11, 12, 22, 23]. Although achieving
Shannon’s perfect secrecy is conditional [23], computational
secrecy can be guaranteed [11]. Encryption algorithms with
computational secrecy are commonly adopted in cryptography
standards, given that extracting information without the key
is a nondeterministic polynomial time problem (NP-problem)
[12, 22]. However, since the CS projection is linear, the
energy of x can be revealed in y without an accurate decipher.
Unfortunately, the energy feature of neural signals can contain
private information [24]. This information may be leaked if no
additional protection is used.
To mitigate this risk, Chen and colleagues proposed a
method of inserting watermarks to mask the energy features
[16]. Cambareri and colleagues proposed a multiclass en-
crypting scheme [25]. In our application of neural recording,
we hope not to degrade the reconstructed signal quality,
or significantly increase the hardware complexity. Thus, we
propose a pseudo-random key shuffle as well as a synchronized
key updating for disturbing the energy features. The power
penalty of this scheme is negligible for the overall system due
to its low active duty cycle.
B. Elliptic-Curve Cryptography and Key Exchanging
There are two mainstream encryption schemes: symmetric
encryption and asymmetric encryption [26]. Although asym-
metric encryption algorithms have the advantages of stronger
security, they often come at a higher computational cost than
symmetric encryption algorithms. As a result, asymmetric
encryption is often used to share the key for symmetric encryp-
tion. This work adopts a similar strategy. CS is a symmetric
encryption strategy, given that the key (the sampling matrix)
is used in both ciphering and deciphering the messages. We
share the key using an asymmetric encryption scheme.
This work adopts an ECC based key exchanging protocol,
namely Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [27]. ECDH is
an ECC variant of the Diffie-Hellman protocol. ECDH allows
two parties to establish a shared secret key independently. The
shared secret key can then be used directly or for deriving other
keys, which in our case are the sampling matrices.
C. Framework of the Proposed Hybrid Encryption
In a common scenario of neural signal transmission, the
neural recorder (the conventional character Alice) sends the
sampled data to the authorized external system (Bob) via an
insecure wireless channel. Illegitimate parties (Eve) may steal
the messages by eavesdropping. Here we consider the context
where Eve knows the communication protocol, the encryption
algorithms as well as the public keys, but doesn’t have access
to the private keys (CS sampling matrices).
The operation principle of the proposed cryptographic neu-
ral recording system is as follows:
1) Alice and Bob first agree on a set of domain parameters
(public) for the cryptography, including the parameters
of the elliptic curve, the generator point G, etc.;
2) Alice picks a private key Kα and generates a public
key KA = Kα ~G, where ~ is a multiplication defined
by ECC; Similarly, Bob picks a private key Kβ and
generates a public key KB = Kβ ~G;
3) Alice and Bob exchange their public keys KA and KB;
4) Alice and Bob generate a shared secret key Ks using
their private keys and the public keys:
Ks = KA ~Kβ = (Kα ~G)~Kβ (← Bob) (3)
= Kα ~ (G~Kβ) = Kα ~KB (← Alice) (4)
5) Alice and Bob individually generate a set of sampling
matrices ΦS using the secret key Ks;
6) Alice performs CS on acquired neural signal x, and
sends the lower-dimensional measurement y to Bob;
7) Bob recovers the neural signal x from y by solving
optimization problem using ΦS;
8) Alice and Bob shuffle the ΦS according to a pre-agreed
protocol, and then repeat the CS encryption;
9) To prevent from using the same set of ΦS repeatedly,
Alice and Bob would update the KS (thus the sampling
matrix ΦS) periodically on a synchronized manner.
III. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
The high-level block diagram of the proposed neural
recorder (Alice) is shown in Fig. 2. The system consists
of an ultra-low power ASIC and a general-purpose Cortex-
M0 MCU. The ASIC integrates low-noise neural amplifiers,
a mixed-signal CS core, an ultra-low power backscattering
transmitter, and peripheral circuits. A computer interfacing
device (Bob) has been designed for reading back the data
from the neural recorder. A standard USB 2.0 port is integrated
for high-speed communication with the computer system. This
design reuses aspects of our previous work [28, 29].
A. Mixed-Signal CS Core Design
The CS measurement is implemented using mixed-signal
circuits. The execution of the matrix-vector multiplication
3Fig. 2. The high-level block diagram of the proposed neural recording system.
(MVM) based on Eq. (1) is illustrated in Fig. 3 (a). As the
input data xi comes in (at the time of ti), M (dimension of
y) multiply-and-accumulate (MAC) operations between xi and
the corresponding coefficients Φi,j (j=1, 2, ..., M) are executed.
M accumulator registers (ACRs) are used for calculating y.
Fig. 3. (a) Illustration of the mixed-signal MVM operation for CS. (b) The
block diagram of the mixed-signal CS core. (c) The timing diagram of the
PGA, ADC and digital operations.
Since MVM requires repeated MAC operations, improving
its energy efficiency is critical. This work adopts a resolution
reduction scheme for reducing computational costs and power
consumption. We choose to use 4-bit Φs with elements of {0,
±1/8, ±2/8, ±3/8, ±4/8, ±5/8, ±6/8, ±7/8}. Fig. 3 (b) shows
the block diagram of the CS core. Amplified analog signal x
is fed into the CS core, and multiplication is implemented
using a combination of analog and digital processing circuits.
A programmable gain amplifier (PGA) provides a gain of ×4,
×5, ×6, or ×7. An ADC samples the amplified data and saves
the results in the corresponding result registers. The digital
operations include logical bit shifting and complement.
Fig. 3 (c) shows the timing diagram of the CS operation.
The ADC samples four times during one input period with
different PGA gain configurations. The power consumption of
the SAR ADC mainly scales with the sampling rate, whereas
the input buffer and comparator will be gated with the PGA for
power saving during sleep. The digital operations have been
greatly simplified by the analog multiplication. The primary
hardware cost is the ACRs. After the MAC operations finished
after N sampling periods, a parallel to serial converter (P2S)
shifts the measurement y out for wireless transmission.
B. Implementation of the ECDH protocol
As discussed in Section II-B, ECC based algorithms have
advantages over conventional asymmetric cryptography algo-
rithms in terms of speed, security level (given a key length), as
well as the corresponding computational cost. These features
make it attractive for both security-critical applications and
resource-constrained applications, including medical devices.
Among established elliptic curves, we choose Curve25519
for our application, because of its low requirements in memory
and computational resources. Curve25519 and the correspond-
ing Diffie-Hellman functions were originally proposed by
Daniel Bernstein in 2006 [27]. The function is a field-restricted
scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve E:
y2 = x3 + 486662x2 + x (x, y) ∈ F2p (5)
where p is 2255 − 19. When a point P (on the curve E)
multiplies a scalar S, it adds to itself (S-1) times to a point Q,
which remains on the curve E (the set forms an abelian group).
The computation only uses the x-coordinate, thus is often
called x-coordinate scalar multiplication. The x-coordinate
scalar multiplication is repeated twice (on each party) during
the ECDH protocol, for generating the public key and the
shared secret key, respectively.
In this work, we adopt a 256-bit key using a radix 232
representation for the code implementation. The x-coordinate
scalar multiplication can be efficiently computed using the
classic Montgomery ladder [30]. Algorithm 1 describes the
operation in pseudo-codes. Each Ladderstep performs one
differential addition and one doubling [31].
To make the implementation immune to timing attacks, all
input-dependent branches or operations should be avoided.
In this work, we modify the Ladderstep function into two
identical timing functions Ladderstep0 and Ladderstep1,
which will be executed depending on the loop’s variable bit b,
as described in Algorithm 2. In addition, the initial coordinates
are randomly projected in each execution according to [17] to
protect the implementation from differential power attacks.
The 256-bit multiplication and squaring are the most com-
putationally intensive operations. The 256-bit multiplication
is implemented as a three-level Karatsuba multiplication with
time-constant implementation [32]. Squaring operations use
the same Karatsuba algorithm with a faster computing speed
as a result of arithmetic simplification and memory access
reduction [33].
4IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The ASIC was fabricated in 180nm CMOS technology.
The system was assembled on a 4-layer printed circuit board
(PCB). The main PCB contained the ASIC and a micro-
connector for pairing with recording electrodes. The MCU and
the 2.4GHz RF transceiver were assembled on an extension
PCB. The device was powered by a 3.7V lithium battery.
Fig. 4. (a) A micrograph of the fabricated CS ASIC. (b) A photo of the
assembled neural recorder. (c) The specifications of the system. (d) The power
consumption breakdown of the system.
The CS function was tested with pre-recorded intracranial
EEG signals of epilepsy patients [34]. Seizure onset times have
been labeled by experts. The original data was digitized at 12
bits with a sampling rate of 250Hz, and was synthesized by
an arbitrary function generator. Fig. 5 shows the experimental
results. The reconstructed signals from 4x and 8x compression
are plotted in comparison with the original uncompressed
signal. The time-domain waveforms are shown in Fig. 5 (a),
and the spectrograms of a continuous recording of 7.5 hours
are shown in Fig. 5 (b). The reconstructed signals achieved a
high PSNR of 32.75dB.
Fig. 5. Experimental results with a compression ratio (CR) of 4x and 8x.
(a) A 10-min segment of signal during the onset of a seizure. (b) A 7.5-hour
segment of spectrogram showing multiple seizure events.
The neural recording system was tested under mock attacks.
We primarily consider a ciphertext-only attack (CoA) model,
where the attacker (Eve) has access to the ciphered texts,
the encryption algorithms and public domain parameters. Fig.
6 shows the results of a total of 200,000 CoA attacks. For
Fig. 6. Experiment of 200,000 mock attacks using the CoA model. (a) The
ρ between Bob’s and Eve’s reconstructed signals and the original signals. (b)
Bob’s reconstruction vs. Eve’s best shot. (c) The trails where the ∆ρ between
Bob’s and Eve’s reconstruction was minimum.
each data segment, Bob had one reconstruction using the
genuine key, while Eve made 1000 attempts using randomly
generated keys. Here we assumed Eve had prior knowledge of
the signals’ characteristics, thus Eve used the same basis Ψ as
Bob for the signal reconstruction. Fig. 6 (a) shows the Pearson
correlation coefficients ρ (the higher the better) between Bob’s
and Eve’s reconstructed signals and the original signals. The ρ
of Eve’s reconstructions are within a random noise level. Fig. 6
(b) is the scatter graph with x-coordinate being the ρ of Bob’s
reconstruction and y-coordinate being the ρ of Eve’s best
shot. Note that Eve doesn’t know which one is the best shot
since Eve doesn’t possess the ground truth. The circled red
dots highlight the trails where the performance of Eve’s best
attack was closest to Bob’s reconstruction. The corresponding
waveforms are plotted Fig. 6 (c). Eve’s reconstruction doesn’t
reveal meaningful information about the neural signals. The
results suggest that the system is safe from CoA attacks.
As discussed in Section II-A, the CS-based encryption
cannot prevent the energy of the signal, and potentially private
information, from being revealed. Each marker in Fig. 7
indicates a data segment with x-coordinate being the energy
of the signal x and y-coordinate being the energy of the
CS measurement y (without decipher). The plots in the left
column use the same key for CS all measurements. The results
show that seizure events can be classified using only the
5Fig. 7. Experimental results of pseudo-random key shuffle. (a-1,2) and (b-
1,2) show the analysis of EEGs from two patients. The left column (a-1) and
(b-1) use the same key for all CS measurements, and the right column (a-2)
and (b-2) use the pseudo-randomly scrambled keys.
features in y. In comparison, the plots in the right column
use the proposed key shuffle for the CS measurement of the
same dataset. As expected, seizure classification is no longer
possible using only the features in y. This experiment shows
that the proposed scheme successfully places an additional
layer of protection.
To compare with conventional encryption schemes, we
implemented a 256-bit AES on the MCU without data com-
pression. The power consumption was 15.8mW including
wireless transmission. Then we implemented the ECC and CS
hybrid scheme on the MCU. The resulting power consumption
was 2.77mW, corresponding to a 5.7x power saving. At last,
the power consumption of the proposed operation with a
CR of 8x was 442µW. In summary, the developed prototype
achieved an over 35x power-saving comparing with systems
using conventional encryptions.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an energy-efficient wireless neural
recording system with simultaneous data compression and en-
cryption. Novel techniques are proposed to minimize the risks
from malicious attacks while maintaining an ultra-low power
consumption. Experimental results show that the developed
system achieves a secure, reliable, energy-efficient recording
over time. The framework and techniques introduced in this
work will be increasingly needed as therapies involving wire-
less neural interfaces become more prevalent in the treatment
of neurological disorders.
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